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Abstract
We consider a hierarchical organization with two fully rational agents.
The goal of the organization is that of selecting the best alternative out of
several available, and agents are heterogenous in the accuracy with which
they screen the alternatives. We show that, if internal communications be-
tween agents is not possible, the ordering of agents affects the performance
of the organization. More specifically, we find that the expected payoff
of the organization improves when the more accurate agent screens first.
Finally, we note that such optimal ordering makes the hierarchy formally
identical to one in which the internal communication flow is perfect.
1 Introduction
Much economic literature has been devoted to analyze the structure and perfor-
mance of economic organizations. The main motivation behind this branch of
research is the consideration that individuals have limited capability in process-
ing information and, consequently, groups of individuals may be able to perform
better than any single individual. An economic organization can be viewed as a
decision making network in which each node is its constituent agent. The struc-
ture of the organization specifies who gathers information, and who communi-
cates what to whom. The basic feature of an organization is that of aggregating
the decisions taken by each one of its members separately. Therefore, it is the
specific organizational structure that determines the quality of the final decision
undertaken by the organization as a whole.
Since it is natural to assume that agents belonging to the same organization
differ in ability (some individuals make, on average, more accurate decisions than
∗We are indebted to Maarten Janssen for many discussions and helpful suggestions. We
also thank seminar participant at Erasmus University for useful comments.
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others) a legitimate question that arises is whether the ordering of heterogenous
agents affects the performance of a specific organization. Sah and Stiglitz (1986),
and the subsequent literature which follows their approach1, provide a negative
answer to this question. The common feature of this branch of the literature is
that of analyzing the performance of different organizational structures in the
context of project evaluation: several projects, whose quality is unobservable, are
assumed to come in streams, and the organization evaluates them sequentially
in order to distinguish those that are worth implementing from those that are
not. However, there exist many examples in which organizations perform a
different task. For instance, the goal of many organizations is that of selecting
the best out of an arbitrary number of projects (alternatives hereafter) that are
simultaneously available. We call this problem, which is different form the one
considered by Sah and Siglitz (1986), alternatives selection problem. Consider,
for example, the hiring decision of a firm. If the number of vacancies is unlimited
then the firm faces an evaluation problem as it must distinguish those workers
whose marginal productivity is larger than the wage offered form those with a
productivity lower than such a wage. If, on the contrary, only one vacancy is
available, then the problem is typically a selection one as the vacancy should be
given to the most productive worker.
In the project evaluation framework the terminal payoffs are threefold: the
organization gains a profit if it accepts a good alternative, it incurs a loss if
it accepts a bad alternative, and gets a payoff of zero if it rejects the alterna-
tive. Consequently, the performance of a specific organization is determined by
the trade-off between the individuals’ errors of not approving good alternatives
(Type-I errors) and the errors of approving bad alternatives (Type-II errors). In
our alternatives selection framework, on the contrary, the terminal payoffs are
twofold: if the selected alternative is good the organizations gets a high payoff
(say, one), while, if the selected alternative is bad, the payoff is low (say, zero).
In this paper we focus our attention on a hierarchy because it is the most
effective organizational structure to perform the task of selecting the best out
of several alternatives. A two-stage selection problem corresponds here to a
hierarchical structure where the first agent preselects a subsample of alternatives
to be passed to the second stage, and the second agent makes the final selection
by choosing one of the preselected alternatives.
A crucial aspect in any organization is the amount of information that can be
communicated between agents. It is plausible to think that communication, like
decision making, is always imperfect2. In order to account for this imperfection
we consider two extreme cases, one in which there is perfect communication
between agents (denoted by PC), and one in which there is no communication at
all (NC) . In our model agents are assumed to be fully rational and heterogenous
in the accuracy with which they screen the alternatives.
1See for example, Hendrikse (1992), Ioannides (1987), Koh (1992a, b, 1993, 1994a, b) and
Visser (2000).
2For example, communication problems may arise due to the inevitable contamination
that occurs in the process of information transmission, or due to a high degree of labour
specialization.
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We show that, in contrast to the evaluation framework, in the selection
framework the performance of an organization is generally affected by the or-
dering of its agents. We find that the performance of the hierarchy improves
when the more accurate agent screens first. Moreover, by letting the best agent
act first, the organization overcomes the imperfections due to the lack of internal
communication and becomes as efficient as a hierarchy in which the information
flow is perfect. Not surprisingly, when communication between agents is perfect,
the order in which agents are placed does not matter.
It is important to stress that we evaluate the performance of the organization
by its gross expected profit, that is, we assume there is no direct cost involved
in processing information. It is indeed the gross expected profit which, in the
project implementation literature, turns out to be always unaffected by the
ordering of heterogenous agents. If one introduces variable evaluation costs, then
the ordering of agents matters also in the standard implementation framework
(see for example Koh (1992b)).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the selection
problem, in section 3 we investigate the optimal ordering of agents, in section
4 we provide a link between the evaluation approach introduced by Sah and
Stiglitz (1986) and the one3 we take here. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The alternatives selection problem.
There is a population of N alternatives. The quality of each alternative, denoted
by θ, can be high or low, θ ∈ {θH , θL} . A high quality alternative yields utility
of 1, while a low quality alternative yields utility of 0. The share of high-type
alternatives in the population is denoted by α. The organization we consider is
a hierarchy with two agents denoted by 1 and 2. Agent 1 screens all N alterna-
tives and decides which ones to pass to agent 2. Agent 2 screens the subsample
preselected by agent 1 and eventually selects one alternative. The expected
quality of the alternative selected by agent 2 determines the payoff of the or-
ganization. Each agent in the model is interpreted to be Bayesian, with each
of them receiving an imperfect binary signal (high or low) about the quality of
each alternative. A signal observed in stage t is denoted by xt ∈ {ht, lt} , with
t = 1, 2 and we assume that
Pr (ht | θH) = Pr (lt | θL) = qt ∈ (1/2, 1) (1)
Assumption (1) implies that signals have the monotone likelihood ratio property
(MLRP), where qt is the revealing probability of a signal observed in stage t.
Notice that qt denotes also the screening accuracy of agent t. Finally, we assume
that all signals in stage 1 and 2 are statistically independent
Pr (x1, x2 | θi) = Pr (x1 | θi) Pr (x2 | θi) , i = H,L (2)
3The alternatives selection framework is adopted also in Ficco and Karamychev (2004).
There the authors investigate the nature of the optimal strategy profile under different
information-processing limitations.
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We model the PC case by assuming that agent 2 observes not only the signal
outcomes produced in stage 2 but also those produced in stage 1. By doing so,
agent 2 makes his choice based on signals produced in both stages and use the
pair (x1, x2) to determine the overall likelihood value for each alternative4. On
the contrary we assume that, in NC case, agent 2 makes his choice based only
on signals x25 .
The strategies of the two agents are as follows. Agent 1, having observed the
signal outcomes of stage 1, passes a number of h1-alternatives and a number
of l1-alternartives to stage 2. Agent 2 observes the signal outcomes of stage
2 (and of stage 1 in case of PC) and eventually selects the final alternative.
The selection rule of the hierarchy, is therefore defined by the strategy profile
S = {s1, s2} , where s1 and s2 are the strategies sequentially implemented by
each one of the two agents6.
The exogenous parameters α, q1 and q2 induce a distribution over the (N × 2)
matrix of binary signal outcomes, X ≡ [xjt] ≡ [x1,x2], where j = 1, .., N is an
arbitrary alternative, t = 1, 2 is the signalling stage, and x1 and x2 are the
column vectors of signal realizations in stage 1 and stage 2 respectively. The
specific matrix realization X and the strategy profile S, determine the probabil-
ity that each alternative j is eventually selected. When alternative j is selected
the terminal payoff is Pr (θj = θH | xj1, xj2), therefore, the expected payoff of
the organization is
u =
X
X∈X
Pr (X) ·
NX
j=1
Pr (j is selected | X) · Pr (θj = θH | xj1, xj2) (3)
where X is the set of possible matrix realizations. The last probability in (3) is
a standard bayesian update of the prior. The probability in the middle of (3)
is, on the other hand, a function of the strategy profile S and the information
environment. Then, in the PC case
Pr (j is selected | X) = Pr (j is selected in stage 1 | x1)×
×Pr (j is selected in stage 2 | x1,x2)
while in the NC case
Pr (j is selected | X) = Pr (j is selected in stage 1 | x1)×
×Pr (j is selected in stage 2 | x2)
Finally, we assume that agents are fully rational and that the distribution
of types and the structure of the organization are common knowledge.
4One can think of agent 1 and agent 2 as two engineers each one evaluating a different
feature of several projects. Given the common background, agent 2 can read and understand
the report made by agent 1 about each preselected project.
5Think of agent 1 is an engineer and agent 2 as a salesman. The specialization of labour
makes it impossible for the salesman to understand the technical reports written by the
engineer.
6For a complete analysis on the nature of optimal selection strategies in multi-stage selec-
tion games, see Ficco and Karamychev (2004).
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3 The optimal ordering of agents.
In this section we investigate whether the ordering of heterogenous agents affects
the performance of the organization. We model heterogeneity by assuming that
one agent has a high screening accuracy, qH while the other has a low screening
accuracy, qL < qH .We denote by u
¡
qH , qL
¢
(u
¡
qL, qH
¢
) the expected payoff of
the hierarchy when the agent with better accuracy acts first (second).
We start from the benchmark PC case and, not surprisingly, we find that
the performance of the hierarchy is not affected by the ordering of its agents.
Proposition 1 uPC
¡
qH , qL
¢
= uPC
¡
qL, qH
¢
Proof. The perfect communication environment and the rationality of agents
ensure that passing all alternatives to the second stage is always optimal, and
that the optimal selection rule S can be represented by a correct preference
relation over all possible signal pairs. If q1 = qH > qL = q2 the preference
relation is
(h1, h2) Â (h1, l2) Â (l1, h2) Â (l1, l2) (P1)
If, on the contrary q1 = qL < qH = q2, the preference relation is
(h1, h2) Â (l1, h2) Â (h1, l2) Â (l1, l2) (P2)
Such preferences ensure that the hierarchy ranks correctly the rows (alterna-
tives) of the signal realizations’ matrix, and eventually selects the one with the
higher overall likelihood of being of high type. Since Pr (X) = ΠNj=1 Pr (x1j , x2j) ,
it follows form Bayes’ rule that the probability of observing the matrix [x1,x2] ,
conditional on q1 = qH and q2 = qL, equals the probability of observing the ma-
trix [x2,x1] , conditional on q1 = qL and q2 = qH . That is, given an arbitrary
matix, inverting the order of qH and qL induces an identical probability over
the matrix in which the order of the columns is also inverted. Such symmetry,
together with the symmetry of preferences P1 and P2, and the fact that the
terminal payoff Pr (θH | x1, x2) does not depend on the order in which qH and
qL are placed, implies that, indeed, uPC
¡
qH , qL
¢
= uPC
¡
qL, qH
¢
.
We consider now a hierarchy in which communication between agents is not
possible. We find that, here, the ordering of agents affects the performance of
the organization: by having the best screener in the first place the hierarchy
achieves a higher payoff. Moreover, by letting the best agent act first, the
hierarchy overcomes the imperfections due to the lack of internal communication
and turns out to be as efficient as a hierarchy in which the information flow is
perfect.
Proposition 2 uNC
¡
qL, qH
¢
< uNC
¡
qH , qL
¢
= uPC
¡
qH , qL
¢
Proof. If q1 = qH > qL = q2 the preference relation over all possible signal
pairs is
(h1, h2) Â (h1, l2) Â (l1, h2) Â (l1, l2) (P1)
5
It is clear from (P1) that selecting only h1-alternatives is an optimal strategy for
agent 1. The reason is that, independently of the signal realizations of stage 2, l1-
alternatives will never produce an overall likelihood value larger than that of h1-
alternatives. Since it is optimal for agent 2 to select a h2-alternative, the optimal
strategy profile ensures indeed that the alternative eventually selected is the one
with the higher likelihood value. This proves uNC
¡
qH , qL
¢
= uPC
¡
qH , qL
¢
. If,
on the contrary, q1 = qL < qH = q2, the preference relation is
(h1, h2) Â (l1, h2) Â (h1, l2) Â (l1, l2) (P2)
Assume first that agent 1 passes only h1-alternatives. With positive probabil-
ity all preselected alternatives produce signals l2 and at least one l1-alternative
produces a signal h2. When this event occurs the payoff-dominant pair (l1, h2)
cannot be selected because it has been previously discarded by agent 1. As-
sume now that some (possibly all) l1-alternatives are passed in addition to h1-
alternatives . There exists a positive probability that all preselected alternatives
generate identical signals in stage 2 making it impossible for agent 2 to select the
payoff-dominant alternative with probability 1. Thus, for any strategy adopted
by agent 1, there is always a chance that the alternative with the higher overall
likelihood value is not selected. This proves uNC
¡
qL, qH
¢
< uNC
¡
qH , qL
¢
.
The intuition behind proposition 2 is clear. If the more accurate screener acts
first, he does not need to pass to the second stage alternatives that produced a
low signal because, independently of the signal realizations of stage 2, they will
never produce a likelihood value larger than that of alternatives that produced
a high signal in stage 1. Therefore agent 2 knows that he always receives a
subsample of projects with identical x1-signal outcomes. Consequently, he does
not need any explicit information about the signal outcomes of stage 1 in order
to make the right choice: by selecting an alternative that produced a high signal
in stage 2, agent 2 automatically selects the best (in expected terms) alternative.
Such argument can be generalized to an arbitrary number of stages, though,
a more stringent requirement over the relative differences in agents’ accuracy
is needed. If there are T selection stages, ordering the agents in terms of de-
creasing accuracy q1... < qt < ... < qT , solves the problems due to imperfect
communication only if, at any stage t, it is optimal for agent t to pass only
ht -alternatives. Such strategy is indeed optimal provided that qt is such that
Pr (θH | ht, lt+1, .., lT ) ≥ Pr (θH | lt, ht+1, .., hT ) , for any t = 1, .., T .
4 Evaluation versus selection.
We show here how the traditional project evaluation problem can be restated in
terms of our selection model. Consider the problem of deciding whether or not
to implement a project of unknown quality, θ. An organization facing such a
problem is actually undecided between two alternatives: alternative 1 stands for
"implement the project" while alternative 2 stands for "do not implement the
project". Therefore an evaluation problem can be restated as a selection problem
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between two alternatives, provided we impose the following restrictions on signal
outcomes
Pr (h1t | θH) = Pr (l1t | θL) = qt ∈ (1/2, 1) , t = 1, 2 (4)
Pr (h1t | l2t) = Pr (h1t | l2t) = 1, t = 1, 2 (5)
Condition (4) means that, it the project is good (bad), then each screening
stage is more likely to suggest in favor of implementing (not implementing)
the project. Moreover, (5) means that signal outcomes across alternatives are
perfectly correlated: if the report of a screener is in favor of implementing the
project it is necessarily against not implementing it, and vice versa. Notice
that this new formulation is a more restricted7 model than the one presented
in section 2 as, here, we do not allow for the possibility that two alternatives
generate identical signals. This also means that 1 − qt is the probability that
screener t is inclined to accept (reject) a bad (good) project and the standard
analysis of the trade off between Type-I and Type-II errors can be applied.
5 Conclusion.
In this section we stress in more details the differences between the assumptions
we use in the paper and those present in the existing literature. In most of the
literature (see for example, Hendrikse (1992), Ioannides (1987), Koh (1992a, b,
1993, 1994a, b) Sah and Stiglitz (1986)) it is assumed that agents are not ra-
tional. They are characterized by a pair of probabilities with which they accept
good and bad alternatives. These probabilities are determined exogenously and
do not reflect the organizational structure, nor the positions in which agents are
placed. Visser (2000), instead, comes close to our approach as he also assumes
fully rational heterogeneous individuals that cannot communicate the informa-
tion they posses. However, in Visser (2000) the ordering of agents does not affect
the expected payoff of the organization (proposition 3 and proposition 5 in his
paper). The intuition behind this result is the symmetry of the organizational
decision problem and of the knowledge agents have about the structure and each
other’s rationality. The novel selection framework we use here is responsible for
the different results we obtain. Individual rationality itself is not sufficient to
preserve the symmetry of the organizational decision problem. For this to be
the case communication must be perfect, otherwise such symmetry fails to hold.
Our analysis also provides a solution to this problem as we show that the lack
of communication can be overcome by an appropriate ordering of the agents.
Finally, one may argue that, in real life, there exist also examples in which
the more accurate screening stages are placed at higher hierarchical levels. The
finding of our paper seems to address that such practice is not optimal. How-
ever, it is important to stress that we didn’t account for the direct costs usually
involved in any information-processing phase. As it is natural to assume that
7 It is more restricted because we impose perfect correlation between signals of two different
alternatives: if one is high the other is necessarily low, and vice versa.
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the cost of processing information increases with the accuracy with which infor-
mation is processed, it might be the case that having higher accuracy at higher
stages is optimal for the simple reason that, at later stages, less information is
processed. Whenever such ordering is in place, the contribution of our paper is
that of identifying the indirect cost that might emerge due to a lack of internal
communication.
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